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EQUILIBRIUM  IN  EVOLUTIONARY  GAMES: 
SOME  EXPERIMENTAL  RESULTS* 
Daniel Friedman 
Evolutionary game theory informs  the design and analysis of 26  experimental sessions  using normal 
form games with 6-24  players. The state typically converges to the subset of Nash equilibria called 
evolutionary equilibria, especially under conditions of mean matching and history. Mixed strategy 
equilibria are explained  better by  'purification'  strategies than  by  homogenous independent 
individual randomisation. The risk dominance criterion fares poorly in some coordination game 
environments. With small player populations and large gains to cooperative behaviour, some 
players apparently attempt  to  influence other players' actions, contrary to  a  key  theoretical 
assumption. 
Strategic interaction over time can be modelled as an evolutionary game if the 
players do not systematically attempt to influence other players' future actions 
and if the distribution of players' actions changes gradually. Evolutionary 
games first appeared in the theoretical biology literature (Maynard Smith and 
Price, I973;  Maynard Smith,  I982)  but in recent years several leading game 
thcorists have used evolutionary games to address longstanding foundational 
issues  of  equilibrium  selection  and  convergence  (e.g.  Binmore,  I987-8; 
Fudenberg and Kreps, I988;  Selten, I989).  Economists are beginning to notice 
that  the  evolutionary  approach  has  unique  implications  for  economic 
applications. For example, historical accidents may have permanent effects 
when  there are multiple equilibria, and ordinary ('complete  information') 
Nash equilibrium may describe economic outcomes even when decision makers 
know very  little  about  others' payoffs or  strategies (e.g.  Crawford,  I99I; 
Friedman and Fung, forthcoming). Empirical evidence clearly is required to 
assess the economic relevance of evolutionary game theory. 
For more than 40 years, laboratory experiments have been the predominant 
empirical method  for testing game  theoretic propositions. The  laboratory 
studies necessarily examine strategic interaction over time. In most contexts, 
the subjects  seldom try to influence other subjects'  future actions and the action 
distributions change  gradually.'  Evolutionary game  theory therefore is the 
*  Support by the US National Science Foundation under grant SES-9o23945 made this work possible. 
The final revision owes much to the hospitality of WiThI  at the University of Bonn, and to the careful 
readings of two anonymous referees  and the editor of thisJouRNAL.  I am grateful to Debbie Carson and Carl 
Plat for their patient research assistance, to Tim Kolar and Thanh Lim for programming assistance, and to 
seminar participants at Caltech and UCLA and at the University Pompeu Fabra, WEA and ESA sessions 
for useful comments and encouragement. 
'  Some studies investigate trigger strategies or other strategies designed to influence other players' future 
actions. The theory of repeated games is more appropriate than evolutionary game theory for such purposes. 
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natural  theoretical  framework.  Nevertheless,  laboratory  studies up to the early 
i99oS  relied  mainly  on orthodox  static  game  theory  to define  the issues and  to 
structure  the  design  and  data  analysis. 
The  research  reported  here explores  the ability  of evolutionary  game  theory 
to  explain  laboratory  behaviour.  The  central  question  is whether  behaviour 
converges  to Nash  equilibrium  for a variety  of payoff  matrices  under  various 
environmental  conditions.  The  exploratory  nature  of  the  paper  dictates  a 
rather  broad  set  of  treatments  and  rather  heavy  reliance  on  descriptive  (as 
opposed  to inferential)  statistics. The work includes  some follow-up  experiments 
and  some  inferential  statistics,  but  the  reader  should  expect  mainly  broad 
tentative  findings  rather  than  narrow  definitive  results.2 
The  most relevant  previous  research is reported  in Van  Huyck  et al.  (I992). 
The  authors  examine  generalised  two-person  divide-the-dollar  games,  using 
laboratory  procedures  similar  to  the  random-pairwise,  No  History,  one-  and 
two-population  protocols  defined  below.  They  test  the  predictive  power  of 
evolutionary  equilibrium  (also defined  below)  as a Nash  equilibrium  selection 
criterion  for their  games,  with  generally  positive  results. 
The  current paper sketches the basic theory of evolutionary  games in Section 
I,  beginning  with  the  simplest  i-dimensional  case  of single  population,  two- 
action  linear  games.  Such  games  are  classified  into  three  types,  each  with  a 
2-dimensional  analogue.  The  sketch  then  mentions  theoretical  and  practical 
problems  that  may  prevent  convergence  to  either  pure  strategy  (corner) 
equilibria  or  to  mixed  strategy  (interior)  equilibria.  Readers  familiar  with 
evolutionary  game  theory  may  wish  to skip this section. 
Section  II  explains  the  basic  laboratory  procedures  for  the  evolutionary 
game  experiments,  and introduces  the main treatments:  the payoff  matrices for 
one  and for two  populations,  the matching  protocols  (either  random  pairwise 
or  mean  matching),  and  the  information  regarding  the  distribution  of other 
players'  choices  in previous  periods  (either  provided  to all players  or to none). 
Section  III  presents  the  results,  beginning  with  graphical  summaries  of  two 
early sessions. A statistical  summary  of convergence  behaviour  in all 26 sessions 
then  follows. 
The  results  are  largely  consistent  with  theory  and  intuition  about  which 
treatments  and  payoff  matrices  best  promote  convergence.  The  limits  of 
applicability  for evolutionary  game  theory  are probed,  and apparent  attempts 
to  influence  other  players'  future  behaviour  are  documented  for  small 
populations  (four or fewer players)  and for extreme  choices  of payoff  matrices. 
The  results generally  support  the  "purification'  view  of Harsanyi  (I973)  and 
Fudenberg  and Kreps  (I 993)  that mixed  strategy  Nash  equilibria  are achieved 
mainly  through  heterogeneous  individual  behaviour  rather  than  through 
homogeneous  mixed  behaviour.  Perhaps  the  most  surprising  finding  concerns 
the  risk dominance  criterion  favoured  in  recent  years  by  some  theorists  for 
equilibrium  selection  in  coordination  and  other  games  (or  economies)  with 
2 A companion paper, Cheung and Friedman (I 994), focuses on the dynamics of the adjustment process. 
It tests the explanatory power of a parametric learning model against several alternative adjustment models 
with generally positive results. It also surveys some of the recent empirical literature. 
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multiple equilibria. Risk dominance fares poorly in some of the environments 
tested here, apparently because players' deviations are not random trembles 
but rather may be deliberate attempts to persuade other players to seek Pareto 
superior outcomes. 
The last section offers a summary and concluding remarks. 
I.  THEORETICAL  BACKGROUND 
This  section  provides a  brief introduction  to  the  theory  of  one  and  two 
dimensional linear evolutionary games.  See Weibull  (I995)  and  Friedman 
(I99I,  I992)  for more general introductions.3  The essential elements are one or 
two populations of players, e.g. row players as buyers and column players as 
sellers; a  payoff  matrix  (or  bimatrix);  and  an  adjustment dynamic  that 
specifies how the state (i.e. the distribution of actions within each population) 
responds to current conditions. The  theory identifies the  (locally asympto- 
tically) stable steady states, here called evolutionary equilibria (EE), and the 
basin of attraction of each EE, i.e. the set of states that converge to the EE. 
I.A.  Linear  One-dimensional  Games 
Let A =  ((aij)) be a  2  X 2  matrix specifying the payoff to a player choosing 
action i (=  I for top row and =  2 for bottom row) when matched with a second 
player choosing action j  (=  I  for left column  and=  2  for right column). 
Assume all players come from the same population and perceive the same 
strategic situation -  they all think of themselves as choosing rows. Then  the 
second player's payoff is aji and the bimatrix (A, A') specifies the game. But it 
is redundant to write out the transpose A', so a single matrix A will specify a 
game when there is only one population. 
The  current state s =  (p,  I-p)  specifies the fraction p  of players in  the 
population  currently  choosing  action  I  and  the  fraction  I-p  choosing 
action  2.  The  state space is the one dimensional line segment  (or simplex) 
S =  {(p, I-p)  eR2  :o  p <  I}.  The  expected  payoff  to  a  player  choosing 
mixed strategy r =  (x, I-  x) when matched with a random opponent given 
state s is rAs'. 
A central idea in evolutionary game theory is that higher payoff strategies 
become more prevalent over time.4 That  is, the direction of change in s = 
(p, I-p)  is  governed  by  the  payoff  difference d(s) =  (i,  o)As'-  (o, i)As' 
between  the  first action  r =  (i,  o)  and  the  second  r =  (o, I).  If  d(s) > o 
then p increases and s  moves towards the first pure strategy (i,  o),  while if 
3 Some of the material in Subsections L.A and I.B below is adapted from the latter reference. For a good 
sample of recent theoretical research and some introductory material, see the special issues of Games  and 
Economic  Behavior  on evolutionary games (3: I,  i 99  I)  and on adjustment dynamics (5: 3-4,  I 993). The reader 
should be warned that terminology is not yet standardised; for example, evolutionary equilibrium can mean 
different things to different authors. 
4  This 'survival of the fittest' principle is straightforward  when there are only two alternative strategies, 
as in most of the games examined here. With three or more alternatives the principle can be interpreted in 
several different ways, e.g. that rates of change or growth rates of strategy prevalence have the same ordering 
as strategy payoffs, or perhaps only that they are positively correlated. See the general references  for extended 
discussions. 
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d(s) > o then p decreases and s moves towards the second pure strategy (o, i), 
i.e. the dynamic is assumed to be sign preserving. Write the payoff differential 
as 
D(p) = d[s(p)]  =  (i,  -i)  A(p,  i-p)' 
=  (i  -p)  (al2-a22)-p  (a2l-all)  =  (i  -p)  a-pb, 
where the reduced parameters are a =  a12 -a22  and b =  a2l  -all.  Then  the 
graph of D(p) is a straight line with intercept a at p =  o and value  -  b at 
p =  i.  The result is that (apart from the degenerate case a = b = o in which a 
player is always indifferent between her two actions) each payoff matrix falls 
into one of three qualitatively different types as shown in Fig.  i. 
a 
Type 1  D(p) 
a, b>O 
-b  - 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
-b  ---------------------- 
Type 2 
a, b <O  P 
O  4i  NE  <>P 
a 00pD 
Type 3a  Type 3b  -b  ---------- 
as. 0  0b  b <O< a  a  D(p) 
C.S.  0  .1  c.s.  o 
a 
-b 
Fig.  i.  Linear One-dimensional Evolutionary Games. Notes: For payoff matrix 
A-  (all  a::) 
a21  a22 
define  a=  a12-a22  and  b =  a21-all.  The  point  s(p)  =  (p, I-p)  represents  the  current 
evolutionary state for o < p <  i.  The current payoff difference between the two pure strategies is 
D(p)  =  (i -p)  a-pb. 
Type  i:  If a, b > o then the unique root of D(p)  = o isp*  =  a/(a+b).  It is 
immediate from the definitions that p*  is a symmetric mixed strategy Nash 
equilibrium (NE) of the 2-player bimatrix game (A; A'), and it is the only NE. 
More importantly for present purposes, D is downward sloping so p increases 
(decreases)  whenever  it  is  below  (above)  p*.  Hence  p*  is  the  unique 
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evolutionary equilibrium. That  is, for any  sign-preserving continuous-time 
dynamic s =  F(s)  we have s,-+s*  =  (p*,  I-p*)  as t--  oo from any initial 
state  so.  The  same  conclusion  also holds for discrete time  (t =  0,  I,  2,  ...) 
dynamics Ast = acF(st) on S if we add the proviso that the adjustment rate 
parameter c > o is not too large. (We can get unstable oscillations ifpt+l  jumps 
too far over p*.) Familiar type  i  games include versions of Matching Pennies 
(e.g.,  A  =(  )  so a =  b=  2)  and  Hawk-Dove 
(  A  -I  2)  (e.g.  A=(  soa=b=  i). 
Type  2:  For a, b < o, the rootp*  =  a/(a+b)  of D(p)  =  o is still a NE of the 
associated bimatrix game, but now both pure strategies  p =  o and p =  i  are 
also NE. As Fig.  I makes clear, D(p)  slopes upward and is negative (positive) 
for p < p*  (p > p*),  so p*  is an unstable 'source'  separating the basins of 
attraction of the two evolutionary equilibria p = o and p =  i.  An economic 
interpretation is that each pure strategy has increasing returns in type 2 games 
and  decreasing returns in  type  i  games.  Type  2  games  are  often  called 
symmetric coordination games. 
Type  3:  If D(p)  lies above  (below)  the p-axis for all pe  (o, i),  then  the 
second pure strategy p =  I  (the first pure strategy p = o)  is dominant.  Of 
course, the dominant strategy is the unique NE of the bimatrix game and the 
unique evolutionary equilibrium for any sign-preserving  dynamic F. This type 
of game is characterised by ab <  o  (and lal  + Ibl  > o).  The  most interesting 
example is Prisoner's Dilemma, in which payoffs decrease as the dominant 
strategy becomes more prevalent, e.g. 
A =  (  )so  a =-b  =-I. 
2  0 
I.B.  More Complex  Evolutionary  Games 
There are two different ways to get a two dimensional state space. If each 
player  in  a  single  population  of  strategically identical  players  has  three 
alternative actions, then the payoff matrix A is 3 x 3 and the current state is a 
point in two dimensional simplex 
S=  {(p,q,  i-p-q)  eR3:p,  q > o,p+  q <4. 
Fig. 2 illustrates a version of the 'Hawk-Dove-Bourgeois'  game, which has a 
corner NE at (p,  q) =  (o, o) and an edge NE at (2, 3). Under standard dynamics 
(e.g. replicator dynamics; see Weibull for a simple exposition), the corner NE 
is an evolutionary equilibrium and the edge NE is a saddle point. 
Much of the work reported here uses a second way to get a two dimensional 
state space. Suppose there are two strategically distinct populations, each with 
two alternative actions. Then the state for each population can be represented 
by a point in the unit interval [o, i]  so the overall state for the two populations 
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(,1)  /-2  8  3 
A=  0 4 2 
-1  6  4/ 
q 
(2/3, 1/3) 
(0, 0)  (1,0) 
p 
Fig. 2. The Hawk-Dove-Bourgeois game. Notes:  Unstable (source), saddle and stable (evolutionary 
equilibria) are indicated respectively by open (0),  crossed (0)  and solid (0)  dots. The equations 
p =  (i,o,  o)As -  (, ', ')'As  and  q-(o,  i,  o)'As -  (  ,. ,.  )'As  characterise the  dynamics in  the 
interior of the simplex. 
can be represented by a point  (p, q) in the unit square [o, i ] x [o, I  ].  If the 
expected  payoff  to  a  player  in  the  first  (respectively second)  population 
depends  only  on  the  distribution  of  actions  S2 =  (q, i-  q)  in  the  other 
population  (respectively s,  =  (p, i-p)),  then  the  payoffs have  a  bimatrix 
representation rAs'  for player  i  (respectively rBs'  for player 2),  where r is 
the player's own mixed strategy and A and B are given 2  X 2  matrices. 
For example, consider an asymmetric version of the Battle of the Sexes game 
with 
A=(I  2)  and  B=(3  I) 
The arrows in Fig. 3 a are vectors (D(q), D(p))  for this payoff bimatrix. Battle 
of the Sexes is a two-dimensional analogue of a coordination (Type 2)  game in 
that it has two pure-strategy NE (at p =  q =  o and at p =  q =  i)  both of which 
are also evolutionary equilibria for any  sign-preserving dynamic,  and  one 
mixed NE whose stable saddle path separates the two basins of attraction. 
Fig.  3b  illustrates a  Buyer-Seller game  (Friedman,  i99i,  p.  64I)  with 
bimatrix 
A=(2  )  and  B=(2  4). 
This two dimensional game is analogous to Hawk-Dove  (Type  i)  because it 
has a unique, interior NE. It can be shown that this NE is an EE under some 
reasonable dynamics (e.g. fictitious play) but not under others (e.g. Cournot). 
Fig. 3c illustrates the bimatrix game 
A=('  4)  and  B=(3  ) 
2  -I  2  0 
The first action (top row) is dominant for population 2 players, and the second 
action (bottom) is the best reply by population  i  players. Hence the corner 
(p,  q) =  (o, i)  is  the  unique  NE,  analogous  to  type  3  games.  This  NE  is 
automatically  an  EE  because  it  is  a  solution  by  iterated  elimination  of 
dominated strategies (e.g. Weibull 1995) 
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t,  "'re  t  /'tt  t 
-  *,,,~~t  tt  t  / 
::t,::  ''it 
t  tt  t 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Fig. 3. Some two dimensional evolutionary games. (a) Battle of the sexes. (b) Buyer-seller. (c) 
Iterated dominated strategies. Note: The horizontal axis is p, the fraction of population iplayers 
choosing their first action, and the vertical axis is q, the fraction of population 2  players choosing 
their first action. The arrows are vectors with components (D (q), D (p)), where D (q) =  (i,  -  i 
A  (q, i-  q)'  and  D (p) =  (i,  -  i) B(p, i-p)'  are  the  payoff  differences for  population  iand 
population 2  respectively. The matrices A and B are listed in Table  i. 
Table  i  summarises  these  linear  i  and  2  dimensional  examples,  which  are 
the  basis for the experiments  reported  below.  Some  confusion  may  be averted 
by noting  that  the two population  game  (A; A')  need  not  be the same  type  as 
the  one  dimensional  game  A.  For example,  the  HD  matrix  in  the first line  of 
Table  i  defines  a  i -dimensional  game  with  a unique  NE  (and  EE)  at 
*=  a/ (a +b)  =  [o-  (-  2 )] /{[o-  (-  2 )] +(8  -4)}1  =  2 /3.- 
Hence  HD  is of type  i.  However,  the 2-dimensional  game  HD2,  defined  in line 
6 of the  table,  is not  a type  i  analogue;  it has an interior  NE  at  (p,  q) =  (2/3, 
2/3)  but also has two corne'r NE at (p,  q) =  (i,  o) and at (o, i).  Straightforward 
analysis  discloses  that  for  any  sign-preserving  dynamic  on  the  square,  the 
corner NE  are both EE but the interior NE is not an EE. Hence  HD2  turns out 
to be a Type  2  analogue.  The  intuition  is that  a stable  mixture  of hawks  and 
doves  will  evolve  in a single  population,  but with  two interacting  populations, 
one  will  become  all hawks  and  the other  all doves. 
Many  more  general  sorts of evolutionary  games  may  be of interest  in some 
applications,  but will not be analysed  here. For example,  when  there are own- 
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Table  i 
Some  Payoff  Matrices 
Name  Matrix  Type  NE  EE 
I.  Hawk-Dove  (HD)  -2  8  I  p=  2/3  p=  2/3 
0  4 
2.  Coordination (Co)  5  -I  2  p  =  2/3,  o,  I  P=o,  I 
4  ' 
3.  Weak Prisoner's Dilemma  4  0  3  p =  o  p =  o 
(WPD)  5  I 
A  B 
4.  Buyer-Seller (B-S)  2  0  2  3  I a  (p, q) =  1/4,  1/2)  (p,  q) =  1/4,  1/2)? 
3  -I  -I  4 
A  B 
5.  Battle of the Sexes (BoS)  I  -I  3  -I  2a  (p, q) =  (I/3,  3/5),  (p, q) =  (i,  o),  (o, I) 
(I, 0)  (0, I) 
A  B 
6.  Two-population HD  -2  8  -2  8  2a  (p,  q) =  (2/3,  2/3),  (p,  q) =  (i,  o),  (o,  i) 
(HD2)  0  4  0  4  (I, o),  (0, I) 
A  B 
7.  Iterated dominated strats  I  4  3  I  3a  (p, q) =  (o,  i)  (p,  q) =  (o, i) 
(IDS)  2  -I  2  0 
-2  8  3 
8.  Hawk-Dove-Bourgeoise  0  4  2  S =  (2/3,  1/3,  o),  s =  (o, o,  I) 
(HDB)  -I  6  4  (0, 0, I) 
Notes: The matrices appear here in the same format as on random pairwise (RP) screens: the player 
chooses the row and her opponent chooses the column. The usual convention in game theory literature shows 
the bimatrix as (A; B'). Matrix types are defined in Fig. I and in the text. Some variants of Co called CoI 
and CO2 and variants of WPD  called PD  are also discussed in the text. Matrix 8  (HDB)  has no one- 
dimensional analog. The NE and EE columns respectively  list all Nash equilibria and evolutionary equilibria 
for the matrix. The '?' after the Matrix 4 indicates that this state is an EE for some but not all adjustment 
dynamics. 
population effects (e.g. the payoff to players in population  i  depends on the 
distribution of actions in population i  as well as in population 2)  then the state 
space is still 2 dimensional but larger bimatrices are required to specify a linear 
game. Nonlinear games and higher dimensional games may also be of interest 
in applications; the interested reader should consult papers cited in Weibull 
(I 995) and Friedman (I992). 
I.  C.  Convergence  Issues 
The theory reviewed briefly in the previous two subsections uses a simple sign- 
preserving assumption to  predict  the  asymptotic stability or  instability of 
various  NE.  Several  issues  arise  in  applying  the  theory  to  laboratory 
experiments. First, only modest numbers of players and amounts of time are 
feasible in the laboratory, not the large populations and infinite time horizon 
typically  assumed in  the  theory.  Friedman  (I992)  argues that  the  main 
substantive reason for assuming a large population is to ensure that each player 
perceives that his current action has a negligible impact on other players'  future 
actions, so in effect she is playing a 'game against Nature'. To have a 'large' 
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population  in this sense does not necessarily  require very  many  actual  players. 
For  example,  3  to  4  buyers  and  3  to  4  sellers  are  large  numbers  in  double 
auction  market  games  (Smith,  I982),  and  3  sellers  appears  to  be  a  large 
number  in the oligopolistic  industries  studied  by Bresnahan  and  Reiss  (i99i). 
How  can we detect  violations  of the 'large  numbers'  assumption  that players 
respond  only  to  their  own  current  payoff  differential,  e.g.  to  D(p)?  An 
alternative  assumption  is that  some  players  believe  that  if they  try to increase 
the average  payoff  then others will follow suit. Specifically,  given  a 2  X 2 matrix 
A  defending  a  i  dimensional  linear  game,  call  a  player  Kantian  (after 
Immanuel  Kant's  famous  'categorical  imperative'  to act as you wish everyone 
else  to  act)  if  she  maximises  the  mean  payoff  M(p)  =  (p, i -p)  A(p, I-p)', 
i.e. chooses the first (second)  action when M(p)  is increasing  (decreasing)  at the 
current  state s(p).  We  can  look for changes  in the prevalence  of Kantian  play 
and  other  changes  in  behaviour  as  we  vary  the  number  of  players  in  a 
population  and  as we vary  the payoff  matrix  so as to alter  the individual  and 
group  incentives,  D(p)  and  the  slope  of M(p). 
A second  issue concerns  convergence  to pure strategy  NE.  Experimentalists 
going  back  at  least  to  Siegel  (I96I)  have  noted  that  subjects  resist excessive 
repetition.  Recently  McCabe,  Michelitsch  and  Smith  have  begun  to  study 
performance  on a task analogous  to playing  dominant  strategies,  and they find 
5-I3  %  deviant  responses  asymptotically,  depending  on  the  environment  and 
rewards  (Michelitsch,  I992).  At mixed  NE,  deviations  can have either sign and 
hence  may  largely  cancel  in the  aggregate.  At  pure-strategy  NE,  by contrast, 
deviations  are all of the  same  sign,  so we  might  expect  that  here  convergence 
will  remain  incomplete. 
A  final  issue  concerns  convergence  to  mixed  strategy  NE.  Since  the  I950S 
experimentalists  have  reported  difficulty  in obtaining  convergence  to a mixed 
NE;  see  the  Rappoport  and  Orwant  (I962)  survey,  for  example.  More 
recently,  J. Friedman  and  R.  Rosenthal  (I986)  report  behavioural  steady 
states  displaced  from mixed  strategy  NE.  Harsanyi  (I 973),  Selten  (I988)  and 
Jordan  (I99I),  among  others,  present  theoretical  arguments  for  the  stability 
of  mixed  NE.  Crawford  (I985)  and  Jordan  (I993),  among  others,  present 
arguments  against  stability  that  appear  to apply  at least  to mixed  NE  for two 
population  games  like Buyer-Seller.  Harsanyi's  argument  is called  'purifica- 
tion'  and,  roughly  speaking,  says  that  players  each  choose  pure  strategy  best 
responses  after  privately  observing  independent  tiny  random  perturbations 
of  their  payoffs;  typically  an  outside  observer  of  one-shot  games  cannot 
distinguish  the result of the perturbed  games from the mixed  strategy  NE of the 
original  game.  Fudenberg  and  Kreps  (I993)  extend  this idea  to prove  that  a 
learning  process  can  converge  to mixed  NE.  The  other  authors  propose  vary 
different  approaches  that  I will  not  attempt  to explain  here. 
To  summarise,  there is a body  of theory  which  identifies  the behaviour  one 
should  eventually  observe  in  simple  strategic  interactions  among  players 
belonging  to  one  or  two  populations.  Assuming  the  dynamic  adjustment 
process  is sign-preserving  and  convergent,  the  eventual  behaviour  is charac- 
terised  by  the  evolutionary  equilibria  (EE),  a  subset  of  the  Nash  equilibria 
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(NE)  associated  with  the  payoff  functions.  The  same  set of ideas  leads  to  the 
classification  of bimatrix  games into  a few basic types. The  empirical  relevance 
of  this  evolutionary  theory  can  be  questioned  on  several  grounds:  time  and 
populations  are finite and discrete,  not infinite  and continuous;  corner EE  (i.e. 
pure  strategy  NE)  may  not  quite  be  reachable;  and  interior  EE  (i.e.  mixed 
strategy  NE)  may  be unstable,  especially  in two  population  games.  Empirical 
work  clearly  is in  order. 
II.  LABORATORY  PROCEDURES 
II.A.  Basic Procedures 
The  experiments  consist  of  6o-I20  minute  laboratory  sessions  using  profit- 
motivated  subjects. Payoffs are calibrated  to produce  average  earnings of about 
US$io  per  hour  per  subject.  Realised  earnings  depend  sensitively  on  chosen 
actions  and typically  vary from $8 to $32 per subject in a two hour session. All 
subjects receive written  instructions  (available  from the author  on request)  and 
about  2 hour training  on the computer  prior to participation  in a session. Each 
session  consists  of  60-200  periods  of  strategic  interaction  among  6-24 
undergraduate  subjects,  the  players.  In  each  period  the  players,  seated  at 
visually  isolated  terminals,  review  historical  data  and  the payoff  function,  and 
choose  an action  from a menu  of two  or three possible  actions.  The  choices  of 
all players are sent to a central processor  (a Sun workstation)  that computes  the 
outcomes  and  notifies  all  players.  Then  players  receive  updated  histories  in 
preparation  for the  next  period.  All  these  features  are publicly  announced. 
Fig.  4 illustrates  the players'  screen displays  under  the alternative  matching 
p,rotocols, RP  in Panel  A and MM  in panel  B, explained  below.  In either case, 
the player  enters and confirms her current  action  (a or b) at the keyboard.  The 
action is displayed  on the screen in the lower left box, and the possible outcomes 
are highlighted  in  the  payoff  box  on  the right.  When  all players  have  chosen 
and  confirmed  their  actions,  the  realised  payoff  appears  at the intersection  of 
the  highlights  in  the  payoff  box  and  then  is displayed  in  the  upper  right  box 
along  with  other  historical  data. 
II.B.  Treatments 
The  experiments  seek  to  identify  conditions  under  which  evolutionary  game 
theory  adequately  characterises  actual  play  in  a diverse  set of simple  games. 
Diversity  is achieved  by varying  the  treatments,  or environmental  conditions, 
across  and  within  experimental  sessions.  The  main  treatments  are the  payoff 
function,  the  matching  rules,  and  the  information  conditions. 
Table  I lists the  eight  basic  payoff  functions  used  in  the  experiments.  Note 
that all three types of linear  I  -dimensional  payoff functions  are represented,  as 
well  as their 2-dimensional  analogues.  The  Coordination  matrix is a bit special 
in that the two pure strategy  NE  satisfy conflicting  selection  criteria  (Harsanyi 
and Selten,  I 989): p =  I is payoff  dominant  (all players get 5 per period versus 
I per period in the other pure NE),  while p =  o is risk-dominant  (an opponent's 
deviation  actually  increases  a player's  payoff  by 3 versus a decrease  by 6 in the 
first NE).  The  third  matrix  in the  table,  Weak  Prisoner's  dilemma  (WPD),  is 
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Fig. 4. Players' screens. (a)  random pairwise matching. (b) Mean matching. 
one of the more interesting  Type  3 games  in that  the dominant  strategy  is just 
barely  so (payoffs  of 5 or  I versus 4 or o for the alternative  action)  and  the NE 
payoff  of  I  is far less than  the  'cooperative'  payoff  of 4. The  two  dimensional 
analogue  IDS  is also  chosen  to  challenge  the  theory:  the  dominant  strategy 
(q =  I)  for the  second  population  is just  barely  so,  and p =  o becomes  a best 
response  for the  first population  only  when  q >  5/6. 
The  experiments  examine  two  alternative  procedures  for matching  players. 
Under  the  random  pairwise  (RP)  procedure,  the  computer  randomly  picks  a 
matching  scheme  independently  in each  period,  each  admissible  scheme  being 
equally  likely.  For  example,  in  a  I  X  I2  Hawke-Dove  game,  the  single 
population of players might be paired {o,  2},  {I,  9},  {3, I I},  {4, 5}, {6, Io) and 
{7, 8} in the third period. The payoff matrix appears on the right side of the 
player's screen in this treatment, as shown in Fig. 4a. The convention is that 
every player sees herself as choosing the row and her opponent as choosing the 
column. 
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Under  random  pairwise  matching  for payoff  matrix  A,  a player's  expected 
payoff  is  rAs'  if  he  chooses  strategy  r  and  the  distribution  of  actions  by 
potential  opponents  is  s.  However,  his  actual  payoff  depends  on  the  action 
taken by his actual  opponent,  and so has some variance  around  its expectation. 
The  variance  is eliminated  in the alternative  matching  procedure,  called  mean 
matching  (MM).  Here  each  player  is  matched  once  against  each  possible 
opponent  in  each  round  and  receives  the  average  (mean)  payoff.  Fig.  4b 
illustrates  mean  matching  with  I 2 players  and  the Hawk-Dove  payoff  matrix 
A  2  80 
For example,  if 6 of  I 2 players choose  the first action  then  the state is (p, i -p) 
=  (o s,o  5)  and  the payoff  is  (i,o)  A(o  s,o  5)'  =  3-o  for the first action  and  is 
(o,  i)  A(o05, o05)' =  2-0 for the second action. 
From  the viewpoint  of standard  game  theory,  the matching  protocols  define 
quite  different  games.  RP  approximates  a  series  of  2-player  non-repeated 
games,  while  MM  defines  a single  repeated  n-player  game,  where  n is the sum 
of  the  population  sizes.  From  the  viewpoint  of  evolutionary  game  theory, 
however,  the protocols  define games  which  are equivalent  except  that RP  adds 
sampling  error to  the  payoff  function  rAs'. 
The  third  major  treatment  variable  is the  amount  of historical  information 
to appear  in the upper  left box  on each  player's  screen.  In  the minimum  level 
No Hist-the player  receives  no historical  information  other than what  she could 
tabulate  herself:  her own  action  and  actual  payoff  in previous  periods.  In  the 
usual  level,  Hist,  the  box  contains  a  list  of  the  actual  state  of  the  relevant 
population  in previous  periods.  In Fig.  4a for example,  the player  can see that 
9 of  I 2 players  took action  A in period  i,  then  8 in period  2, and  so forth,  for 
an  average  of  7-2 in  periods  I-5.  The  evolutionary  game  literature  contains 
many  papers  that  implicitly  or  explicitly  assume  information  conditions 
corresponding  to  Hist  and  many  others  corresponding  to  No  Hist,  so  both 
treatments  are worth  a look  and  the  comparison  is interesting.  Of  course,  in 
every  treatment  the  actions  and  identities  of  individual  opponents  remains 
confidential. 
Two  other  treatment  variables  deserve  brief  mention.  Population  sizes  are 
varied  to  test  for  the  presence  of  small  numbers  effects  such  as  Kantian 
behaviour  in Prisoner's Dilemma  or Coordination  experiments.  The  number  of 
players  varies  across sessions -  e.g.  perhaps  I 2 players  in one session and  I6  in 
another.  Some  sessions employ  split groups in some periods -  e.g.  all i 6 players 
belong  to a single  population  in the first 40 periods,  then  are divided  into  two 
separate  8-player  groups  (no pairing  or mean-matching  across the two groups) 
for the next  8o periods,  and reunited  into  a single  group  for the last 40 periods 
of a  i 6o  period  session. 
The  final  treatment  variable  is  run length. A  run  of  several  periods  (all 
treatments  held constant)  is required  to test for convergence  for a given  payoff 
matrix  and  player  population.  Runs  are separated  by obvious  changes  in  the 
player  population  and/or  the  payoff  matrix,  the  least  significant  being  an 
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Table  2 
Experimental  Design Summary 
Payoff Matrix  No. of populations x  Runs x  Other 
Session  Name  (type)  population size  run length  treatments 
exp  I*  WPD  I  X  12  6x  io  MM/RP 
exp  2*  WPD  I X 12  8xIo  MM/RP 
exp  3  HD,  Co  I  X  12  12  X  10  MM/RP 
exp  4  WPD  I  X  I6/2  12  X  10  MM/RP 
exp  5  B-S  2  x 6  12  X  10  MM/RP 
exp  6  HD,  Co  I  X  12  ioxi6  MM/RP 
exp  7  BoS  2  X  5  I2  X  IO  MM/RP 
exp  8*  Co,  HD  I X  12  12  X  14  MM/RP;  Hist/No 
exp  9  HD,  Co  i  x  io  14X  i6  Hist/No 
exp  Io*  HD,  (HD)2  I  X  I6/2,  2x8  12  X  I6  Hist/No 
exp  ii  HDB  I  X  12/2  II  x  15  MM/RP,  Hist/No 
exp  I 2  WPD  I  X  12/2,  4,  6  24X  10  Hist/No 
exp  13  BoS, B-S  2 X 8  i6  x 12  Hist/No, 
exp  14  HD,  (HD)2  I  x  I6/2,  2  x  8  6 x  i6  MM/RP;  Hist/No 
exp  I5  HD,  Co  I  X  12  I8 x Io  MM/RP 
exp  i6*  Co  I X  12/2,  3,  4,  6  12  X 10  MM/RP 
exp  I 7  HD,  BoS  I  X  I6/2,  2  X  8  15 X 10  none 
exp  i8  Co  I X I6/2,  4,  8  i6x  io  MM/RP 
exp  I9  BoS,  B-S,  (HD)2  2  x 6  I8X Io  MM/RP 
exp  20  Co  I X 12  12  X 10  MM/RP 
exp  2I  HD,  Co  I X  12/2  i8 x Io  MM/RP;  Hist/No 
exp  22  HD,  HD2  I X  12,  2  x 6  I8 x Io  MM/RP,  Hist/No 
exp  23  HD,  HD2,  B-S,  BoS  I  X  12,  2  x 6  i6  x  i6  MM/RP;  Hist/No 
exp  24  HD,  Co, PD  I x  i6/2  20  X  IO  MM/RP;  Hist/No 
exp 25  HD,  Co, PD  I  X I2  20X  10  none 
exp  26  HD,  Co, PD, HD2  I X  I2/2,  2  X 6  21  X  IO  MM/RP;  Hist/No 
exp 27  B-S, BoS, IDS  2  X 8  I9  x  IO  MM/RP;  Hist/No 
exp 28  B-S, BoS, IDS  2  x 8  20X  IO  MM/RP;  Hist/No 
exp 29  B-S, BoS, IDS, HD2  2  X 8  I8X Io  MM/RP;  Hist/No 
exp 30  B-S,  BoS, IDS, HD2  2  X 8  20X  IO  MM/RP;  Hist/No 
Notes:  An  asterisk  after  the  session  number  indicates  that  some  periods  of  the  session  had  erroneous 
displays and therefore the data are excluded from the main analysis. The full matrix names, e.g. Weak 
Prisoner's  Dilemma for WPD, are given in Table  i.  The notation I x  I6/2  in the third column means that 
the  i6  players  in  a single  population  are split  into  two  non-interacting  8-player  groups  in  some  runs.  A  run 
is a set of consecutive  periods  with  no  changes  in payoff  matrix,  group  composition  or other  treatments.  For 
example,  the  entry  6 x  IO in  column  4 means  that  the  6o  periods  in  that  session  constituted  6 runs  each  Io 
periods  long.  The  default  values  of  the  other  treatments  are  the  mean  matching  protocol  (MM)  and  the 
provision  of  historical  information  on  population  distributions  (Hist);  the  alternative  values  of  random 
pairwise  matching  (RP)  and  no  historical  information  (No)  are  mentioned  in  the  last  column  when 
applicable. 
interchange  of payoff  matrix  rows and  columns.  The  history  box also is erased 
at the beginning  of a new run. If runs are too short then convergence  will never 
be  clear,  but  if runs  are  too  long  then  players  may  respond  to  boredom  (or 
possibly  to  repeated  matching)  rather  than  to  current  payoffs.  Typical  run 
lengths  are  io  or  i6  periods,  and  behaviour  is also compared  across half-runs 
of 5 or 8 periods. 
Table  2  sketches  the  experimental  design  by  session.  For  example,  in  the 
third session,  exp  3, a single  population  of  I2  individuals  played  I2  ten-period 
runs,  some  runs  using  Hawk-Dove  payoffs  and  some  using  Coordination 
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payoffs.  Some  runs used the MM  matching  protocol  and some used RP.  Other 
sessions differed in various ways. Exp 4, for example,  featured  a single  I 6-player 
population  in  half  the  runs  and  two  non-interacting  8-player  populations 
('split  groups')  in  the  other  runs.  In  general,  treatments  were  varied  in  each 
session in  a balanced  fashion  to avoid  confounding  the  variables. 
II.C.  Testable Hypotheses 
The  data  analysis  emphasises  convergence  behaviour.  The  state  might 
converge  to  a population  distribution  s -  call  this  a behavioural  equilibrium 
(BE) -  that  may  or  may  not  coincide  with  a  theoretical  equilibrium,  Nash 
(NE)  or  evolutionary  (EE).  The  formal  data  analysis  begins  by  proposing 
empirical  criteria  for convergence  and  coincidence,  and  then  uses the criteria 
to  test  the following  hypotheses: 
(i)  Some BE is typically  achieved  by the second half of a (i o-i  6 period)  run. 
(2)  BE  typically  coincides  with  NE. 
If  a payoff  matrix  admits  several  NE,  some  of which  are  EE  and  some  of 
which  are not,  then  we  have  the  more  refined  hypothesis: 
(3)  BE  typically  coincides  with  EE,  especially  those  with  larger  basins  of 
attraction  and/or  those whose  basins of attraction  contain  the initial  state of the 
run. 
A  second  goal  of  the  data  analysis  is  to  compare  convergence  behaviour 
across  treatments.  The  relevant  hypotheses  include: 
(4)  No  'small-group'  effects  appear  for population  sizes six or larger. 
(5)  Convergence  to BE  is faster  in  the  mean-matching  (MM)  than  in  the 
random-pairwise  (RP)  treatment. 
(6)  Convergence  to  BE  is  faster  in  the  usual  Hist  treatment  than  in  the 
alternative  No Hist  treatment. 
In  addition  I  test  the  convergence-related  hypothesis: 
(7)  Individual  behaviour  at  a  mixed  strategy  BE  is  better  explained  by 
idiosyncratic  'purification'  strategies  than  by identical  mixed  strategies. 
III.  RESULTS 
III.A.  Overview 
Fig.  5  charts  the  time  path  of  the  state  st in  the  first four  runs  of  exp  3,  a 
successful  I 2 player  session consisting  of I 2 runs each  I o periods long.5 The  first 
four  runs  use  Hawk-Dove  payoffs,  with  a  unique  mixed  strategy  Nash 
equilibrium  at s*  =  2/3  =  8/I2.  That  is, in NE  8 of  I2  players  choose  the first 
strategy  (or 4 of  I 2  when  the matrix  rows and columns  are interchanged  as in 
runs 2 and 3). The  graphs show a tolerance  of I player in the band  around  NE, 
SO  7, 8 or 9 players  choosing  the  first strategy  (or 3, 4 or 5 players  when  the 
matrix  is  interchanged)  in  any  given  period  counts  as  a  'hit'  for  the 
Hawk-Dove  NE.  The  time  paths  in  the  first four  runs  suggest  that  the  NE 
5  Sessions expi  and  eXp2  were invalidated by computer program glitches that scrambled the payoff 
matrices, so the data  are omitted from subsequent analysis. The  intended matrices were type 3  (Weak 
Prisoners'  Dilemma). Most valid runs saw convergence to the NE. 
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Fig. 5. Session exp 3: runs 1-4. 
attracts  states st outside  the tolerance  band s* +  I /  I 2,  but there is considerable 
behavioural  noise  so hits occur  in only  about  50 %0 of the  periods.6 
Fig.  6 graphs  behaviour  in the first four runs of exp  5, the first 2-population 
session. All periods use the Buyer-Seller  matrix from Table  I or its interchange, 
so the unique  NE  is at  (p, q) =  (o025, o0so) or, for the interchanged  version,  at 
(o075, o0so). The  graphs  show  the time  path  of the state st in its space,  the unit 
square.  The  time path  is smoothed  by a 2-period  moving  average,  so the point 
graphed actually is (St-,  +  St) /2.  The time path in first  run looks like an unstable 
counterclockwise  spiral diverging  from the NE.  The  second  run looks like a tidy 
counterclockwise  double  loop  around  the  NE,  neither  converging  nor 
diverging.  The  third run uses the RP matching  protocol;  at best there is a weak 
6  Graphs of the remaining runs, suppressed  here to conserve space, can be summarised as follows. Run 5, 
the first of four Coordination runs, appears to represent  slow, incomplete convergence from the theoretically 
unstable mixed strategy NE  towards the risk-dominant (and Pareto inferior) NE  S* =  o.  Run  6,  quite 
surprisingly,  appears to represent  convergence to the theoretically unstable mixed strategy NE. Run 7 shows 
clear convergence to  the  risk-dominant NE  S* =  I22/I2  after the  matrix interchange. Perhaps due  to 
hysteresis, run 8 convergences quickly to S* =  I2/I2,  now the payoff-dominant NE because the matrix 
interchange was negated. The last 4 runs of the session again are Hawk-Dove.  Now there seems to be less 
behavioural noise and most periods are hits. The session as a whole provides little evidence that the matching 
procedure (MM or RP) has any effect. 
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Evgame experiment: exp 5 run 3  Evgame experiment: exp 5 run 1 
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Fig. 6. Session exp 5: runs I-4. 
tendency to drift towards the NE. The fourth run reverts to MM and looks like 
a counterclockwise spiral converging to the NE.7 
Looking at a large number of such graphs, one gets the general impression 
that behaviour tends to settle down to a BE under all treatments, more rapidly 
and  closer to  EE in  some treatments than in  others. None  of the  testable 
hypotheses seem grossly inconsistent with the graphs. The rest of this section 
examines the hypotheses more quantitatively. 
III.B.  Convergence  Criteria 
The general criterion for convergence is that deviations from a given steady 
state s* are small. Specifically, for a pre-selected tolerance bound b > o, say 
that the state converged to s* in run (or half-run) r with L periods if 
L  s,-s*  |  b,(I 
ter 
The remaining 8 runs in the session seem to tell much the same story: slow approximate convergence 
to the NE via counterclockwise  spirals, with perhaps larger and more biased deviations in the RP runs than 
in the MM runs. Complete graphs of all sessions are available on request at reproduction cost. 
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i.e. if the mean  absolute  deviation  from se does not exceed  the tolerance  bound 
in  a given  run  or half-run.  In  2-population  games  the  norm  1  l in  inequality 
(i)  is interpreted  as the sup norm -  i.e. the larger absolute  deviation  of the two 
populations.  Behavioural  equilibrium  (BE)  now  can  be defined  operationally 
for any  run or half-run  as convergence  to the median  state,  i.e.  inequality  (I) 
holds for s* =  the soth  percentile  of states realised in the given  run or half run. 
The  operational  definition  for  convergence  to  NE  or  EE  is  simply  that 
inequality  (I)  holds  with  s*  equal  to a given  NE  or EE  state. 
The  summary  data  discussed  below  use two  tolerance  bounds.  In the  'tight 
criterion'  b =  I/N,  and in the 'loose  criterion'  b =  2/N,  where  Nis  the number 
of players  in each  population.  For example,  in a two  population  game  with  8 
players  in  each  population,  the  tolerance  bounds  are  O*I25  (tight)  and  o025 
(loose). 
Table  3 reports  instances  of convergence  by half-run.  For  example,  in a  IO 
period  run the two half-runs  are periods  I-5  and periods  6-IO.  In the 355 first 
half-runs,  BE is achieved  over  92  0  of the time  by the loose  criterion  and over 
460%  by  the  tight  criterion.  In  the  353  second  half-runs  (computer  crashes 
wiped  out two second  half-runs),  the convergence  percentage  rises to over 98 % 
(loose)  and  70 0  (tight).  The  majority  of BE coincide  with  NE;  in second  half- 
runs, for example,  about  79  0  (=  77 5/98  3) of the loose BE are loose NE.  Only 
a very few NE  are not EE,  but this empirical  result is unsurprising  because  for 
many  of the  payoff  matrices  investigated  here  all  NE  automatically  are EE. 
The  statistics in Table  3 are intended  mainly  to detect  regularities  for further 
investigation.  A more detailed  look at convergence  for each type of game  is now 
in order. 
III.C.  Behaviour  in Type  i  Games 
Recall  that  HD  and  other  Type  I  matrices  have  a unique  NE.  It  lies in  the 
interior  of  the  state  space  [o, i],  and  is  an  EE.  Evolutionary  game  theory 
predicts  convergence  to  this  NE  since  it  is  an  EE,  but  some  game  theorists 
predict  nonconvergence  because  the NE  is in mixed  strategies.  Row  3 of Table 
3  at  first  seems  to  give  support  to  both  views  because  it  reports  a  loose 
convergence  rate of over  87 % but  a tight  convergence  rate of less than  33  0  0. 
The underlying  data show that tight convergence  is at least 50  0  more frequent 
in  second  half  runs  than  in  first half  runs,  and  under  MM  than  under  RP. 
Convergence  is  also  more  frequent  under  Hist  than  under  No  Hist.  My 
conclusion  is  that  the  state  indeed  converges  to  the  unique  NE  but  that 
convergence  can  be slow,  especially  under  the  RP  matching  protocol  and  the 
No  Hist  information  treatment. 
Does  the  state  converge  to  the  NE  because  individual  players  adopt  the 
mixed  NE strategy?  In that case we would  expect  to observe loose but not tight 
convergence,  as in fact we usually  do.8 A closer look at the raw data,  however, 
8  To  simplify  the  calculation  a  bit,  suppose  the  symmetric  equilibrium  strategy  is  to  play  each 
pure strategy with probability 0o5 and that the median state is s* =  o 5, and suppose there are I 2  players. 
We need the probabilities that the mean absolute deviation (MAD) of the states St from the median s* is 
less  than  I/I2  =  0o083  and  2/I2  =  O-I67,  when  each  state  is  the  average  of  I2  independent 
Bernoulli trials with p =  05.  Back-of-envelope calculations  give  approximate  mean  and  variance  for 
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Table 3 
Convergence  Percentage  by Half Run 
Tight criterion (%)  Loose criterion (%) 
Runs  Nobs  BE  NE  EE  BE  NE  EE 
i.  First-half  355  46.2  I8 9  I5-6  92  I  64 5  46.5 
2.  Second-half  353  70?4  394  36.7  98-3  77-5  65-o 
3.  HD  I56  551I  32  7  32  7  96  2  87.2  87.2 
4.  Coordinate  I I6  79 7  40?5  25.9  98.3  69.4  4I8 
5.  WPD  24  95-8  64 6  64 6  95.8  9I17  9I.7 
6.  HDB  24  50-0  33 3  33-3  79-2  37-5  37-5 
7.  IDS  6o  350 ?  I0-0  I0-0  9I57  30  0  30  0 
8.  BoS  I28  6I-7  40 6  391I  93-0  75.8  56.3 
9.  HD'  92  52.2  I 6.3  I4  98-9  8I.5  26-I 
i o.  B-S  84  274  8.3  8.3  88-  I  56.o  56.o 
I I.  MM  I 74  60-9  42-0  40?2  93 7  77  0  70'4 
I2.  RP  206  718  30  I  23  3  98-5  77-7  57-0 
I 3.  Hist  I 8o  66- i  331  3  4  98.3  72.2  6I*9 
I4.  No Hist  I28  65.2  2I-9  I8-8  97 7  80-I  57.8 
Note: The table is based on all data from sessions  3-30  of Table 2 with the exception of sessions 8 and I6 
(scrambled matrices), the MM/split  group runs of session I 7 (data not recorded properly), and sessions I 2 
and  i 8 (small groups used). Session i i  involves a qualitatively different (3  action) environment and so is 
excluded from the first two lines of the table. The  last two pairs of lines are based on  (approximately) 
balanced subsamples drawn entirely from sessions in which both of the alternative treatments were used. 
Specifically, lines I I-I2  (MM vs. RP) are based on sessions  3, 4, 5,  7,  I4,  I5,  I9-24  and 26,  and lines I3-I4 
(Hist vs. No Hist) are based on sessions 9,  I0,  I3,  I4,  I9-24  and 26. When players are split into two non- 
interacting groups, each group's outcome has weight 0-5  SO  the number of observations (Nobs) is I o for each 
half-run. 
casts doubt on that view; it appears that some players usually play 'Hawk', 
some usually play 'Dove'  and others switch back and forth. This is exactly the 
pattern that Harsanyi's purification approach would suggest if players draw 
the main component of their idiosyncratic perturbations once per run. The 
idea is that players may have slight homegrown preferences for 'Hawk'  or 
'Dove' and that Harsanyi's argument shows how this can lead to the mixed NE 
in the population.9 
A formal test of the purification approach employs the null hypothesis that 
all players independently choose 'Hawk' with NE probability  p =  2/3  in each 
period, and examines the one-sided alternative hypothesis that players change 
their action less frequently across periods. Each  i o period x I 2  player run, 
for example, gives  I 2o  actions and 9 X I2  =  io8  opportunities for a player 
to change her action. We use the standard (but not eponymous) runs test 
(Conover,  i980,  p.  349)  under the  conservative convention  that  counts a 
ISt-s*  of  O'II3  and  O'OII5  in  each  period.  Let  4)(x)  be  the  unit  normal  cumulative  distribution 
function  evaluated  at  x.  Then  the  probabilities of  tight  and  loose  convergence  in  a  5  period  half 
run  are  approximately  I'o-'[V\5(0'II3-0-083)\VooII5)]  =  I-o-(o-626)  =  I0-0734  =  0-26,  and 
I-o-4[V5(0I  I3-o-I67)/\O-OII5)]  =  I-O =  (-I-I26)  =  o-87.  That  is,  if  players  independently  ran- 
domise then we would expect to see tight convergence in only about one quarter of the half-runs, but would 
see loose convergence in about 7/8  of them. 
9 Fudenberg and Kreps  (I993)  assume that perturbations are independent each period. Clearly more 
persistent perturbations would work in a population (as opposed to individualistic) interpretation of their 
model. 
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change  of action  when  the last period  action  of one player  differs from the first 
period  action  of the next player.  In each of the 99 Hawk-Dove  runs we observe 
fewer  changes  of  action  than  predicted  under  the  null  hypothesis;  typically 
changes  are  about  half  as frequent  as predicted.  The  null  hypothesis  can  be 
rejected  in favour  of the  purification  alternative  at  the p =  o  OI  level  in  75 0 
of the runs and usually  at the p =  oooo  I level.  Exceptions  seem more frequent 
in  non-convergent  runs. 
Could  this  result  be  due  merely  to  player  inertia  rather  than  to  small 
differences  in players'  tendencies  to play Hawk  or Dove?  Cochrane's  Qstatistic 
(Conover  p.  I96)  tests whether  players'  dichotomous  actions  are homogeneous 
random  processes.  In  IO  of  I3  sessions  with  Hawk-Dove  runs  the  null 
hypothesis  of player  homogeneity  is rejected  at the o  oooI  level in favour of the 
purification  alternative  that  some  players  are more  likely  than  others  to play 
Hawk.  Even  in  the  three  exceptional  sessions the evidence  on balance  favours 
the alternative  hypothesis.  I conclude  that the Harsanyi  purification  approach 
explains  the  data  much  better  than  the  classical  mixed  strategy  approach. 
The  Buyer-Seller  (B-S)  game  is a 2-dimensional  analogue  of Hawk-Dove. 
Line  I o  of Table  3 shows  a healthy  880%  rate  of loose  convergence  to  BE of 
which  about 
2  are loose  NE.  Tight  convergence  is much  less frequent;  BE  is 
achieved  in only  about  27 %0 of the  half runs and  of these  less than  '  are NE. 
To interpret  these numbers,  note first that the loose target has area (2b)2/b2 =  4 
times the area of the tight target, and that the loose NE frequency (47 of 84) 
is  more  than  four  times  the  tight  convergence  frequency  (7  of  84).  Tight 
convergence  is a bit more frequent  in second  half runs than in first half, and is 
quite  rare under  either  RP  or No  Hist.  Visual  inspection  of the graphs  shows 
that  typically  the state spirals in counterclockwise  towards  the NE  but  there is 
little  tendency  to  complete  convergence  once  the  state  gets  within  loose 
tolerance.  I conclude  that the NE is behaviourally  stable in the weak sense that 
the  state  typically  converges  to  a  (2/N)-neighbourhood  of  the  NE.  Perhaps 
decision  costs  (or lack  of payoff  dominance)  preclude  tighter  convergence. 
III.D.  Behaviour  in Type  2  Games 
Recall  that  type  2  games  (such  as the  Coordination  game  in  Table  I)  have 
three  NE,  two  of which  are  endpoint  EE  and  the  third  of which  is interior, 
separating  the  basins  of  the  EE.  Line  4  of  Table  3  indicates  that  in  the 
experiments  with  such games  behaviour  usually  settles down:  BE convergence 
percentages  are  almost  8o0% with  the  tight  and  over  98%  with  the  loose 
criterion.  Convergence  to  (any)  NE  is surprisingly  infrequent  given  that  the 
three  NE  targets  have  total  width  4b  (width  b for  each  EE  and  2 b for  the 
interior  NE),  so the targets cover  4(2/  I 2)  =  2/3  of the state space  [o, I]  under 
the  loose  criterion  and  4(I/I2)  =  I/3  under  the  tight.  Thus  the  actual  NE 
convergence  rates of 69 0  and  40  0  are close  to what  one  would  expect  if the 
asymptotic  state  were  uniformly  distributed,  and  the EE convergence  rates of 
about  420%  and  260%  are only  slightly  better.  What  is going  on? 
The  data underlying  Table  3 reveal  that tight convergence  to an EE is about 
twice  as frequent  in second  half-runs  as in first half-runs  and  under  Hist  than 
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under No Hist,  and somewhat  more frequent  under  MM  than under RP.  Still, 
tight  convergence  to  EE  remains  rather  infrequent  under  any  of  these 
conditions.  A  possible  clue  is  that,  despite  a  smaller  basin  of  attraction,  the 
payoff-dominant  EE (the PDNE)  accounts  for i 8 instances  of tight convergence 
and  the  risk-dominant  NE  (the  RDNE)  accounts  for only  two  instances.  The 
RDNE  does  have  almost  as many  instance  of loose-but-not-tight  convergence 
(5)  as  the  PDNE  (6),  but  the  net  result  remains  anomalous:  convergence 
(especially  tight  convergence)  is  rare  for  the  EE  with  the  larger  basin  of 
attraction. 
A second  anomaly  is that  the state  sometimes  converges  to the interior  NE, 
an  event  not  predicted  by  evolutionary  (or traditional)  theory.10 Overall,  24 
(resp.  i8)  of the  94 full group  half-runs  converge  loosely  (resp. tightly)  to the 
mixed  strategy  equilibrium  (MNE).  A  closer  look  at  the  graphs  of half-runs 
deemed  loosely  but not tightly  convergent  to MNE  suggests that many  of these 
actually  represent slow divergence  from MNE.  Likewise,  many  of the half-runs 
deemed  BE but  not  NE  seem  to represent  slow  or incomplete  convergence  to 
an  EE,  usually  the  RDNE. 
The  first step  in following  up  on  these  observations  is to see if there  is any 
empirical  difference  between  convergence  to the interior  NE  of a Type  i  game 
(theoretically  stable)  and  of  a  Type  2  game  (theoretically  unstable).  The 
regression  pt -Pt-_l  =(pMNE  -Pt-,)  +et  yields  the  parameter  estimate  f= 
o65  + 0  io  and  R2 =  03  I  for  data  from  Coordination  runs  that  converged 
tightly  to MNE  (D.F.  =  96),  but  yields fi =  o 96 + oo6  and  R2 =  o049 for data 
from convergent  Hawk-Dove  runs  (D.F.  =  273).  Thus,  even  selecting  the most 
favourable  runs, we find  that  convergence  to the interior  NE  in Coordination 
games  is significantly  slower  and  less reliable  than  convergence  to the interior 
EE  in  Hawk-Dove  games. 
The  fact  that  there  is  even  occasional  convergence  to  the  interior  NE  in 
Coordination  games  suggests  that  there  may  be  forces  at  work  beyond  the 
payoff  differential  recognised  by  evolutionary  game  theory.  Do  some  players 
use  forward-looking  or altruistic  strategies?  Some  responses  to  exit  question- 
naires  in  Exp  24,  the  last  Co  session,  suggest  that  they  might:  '[I]  chose  the 
result that would  be most beneficial  to everyone...',  and,  from another  player, 
'I  made  choices  that  would  raise  the  total  score of the  group.'  Perhaps  some 
players  are  Kantian  and  choose  actions  so  as  to  increase  the  mean  payoff 
M(p)  =  (p, I -p)  A (p, i -p)'.  The  standard  Type  2 matrix  from Table  i  is 
Co  (  )  4I 
for  which  M(p)  =  3p2+p+  I  is  increasing  in  p.  Kantian  players  therefore 
would  avoid  the  low  payoff  RDNE  action  (p =  o)  in  this  game.  Risk-averse 
10 Hysteresis potentially provides an evolutionary game theoretical explanation, because sometimes the 
run immediately follows a Hawk-Dove  run in which the interior NE is an EE. Of the I 8 Coordination half- 
runs immediately following HD runs, only three were tightly convergent to the interior NE. This is about 
the same proportion as for all Coordination half-runs. I conclude that hysteresis  plays at best a minor part 
in explaining the anomaly. 
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players,  on the other hand,  might  stick with  the RDNE  action  until  well inside 
the  PDNE  basin,  hence  producing  a  BE  near  the  MNE.  Hence  both 
behavioural  anomalies  potentially  arise from  some  Kantian  behaviour. 
To  test  this  qualification  to  evolutionary  theory,  I  used  the  modified 
Coordination  matrices 
CoI = (5  )  and  CO2  = (5  ) 
3  3  ?  4 
in some  runs of sessions  20,  2 I,  24  and  26. The  basins of attraction  for the EE 
are the same  in Coi  as in  Co,  but  M(p)  is decreasing  in  the first half  [o, I/3) 
of the RDNE  basin  of attraction  [o, 2/3).  The  RDNE  basin  [o, 6/II)  for C02 
is  smaller  than  for  Co,  but  M(p)  decreases  in  [0, 5/I I),  most  of  the  basin. 
Therefore  the  presence  of  Kantian  players  would  make  convergence  to  the 
RDNE  more  likely  with  Coi  and  C02  than  with  the  standard  coordination 
payoff matrix  Co. The  data  strongly  confirm  the prediction:  we have four half- 
runs loosely  convergent  to the RDNE  and  i9  to the  PDNE  with  Co versus  25 
and  I 2 with  the modified  matrices.  The  associated  chi-squared  statistic  of I4-30 
is significant  at least  at  the  o-ooi  level. 
Recall  that  BoS  and  HD2  both  are  two-dimensional  analogues  of Type  2 
games.  Each has three NE,  two EE at diagonally  opposite  corners of the square 
and  an interior  NE  at  the  saddle-point  of the  separatrix  between  the  two  EE 
basins  of  attraction.  Line  8  of  Table  3  suggests  that  evolutionary  theory 
accounts  well  for the  BoS  data.  Despite  the  small  area  b2 of each  corner  EE 
relative  to the  target  area  4b2 of the interior  (non-EE)  NE,  50  of the  52  half- 
runs that  converged  tightly  to some  NE  actually  converged  tightly  to an EE. 
Line  9 of the  table  suggests  that  HD2  runs had  considerably  more  noise  but 
roughly  similar  behaviour. 
III.E.  Behaviour  in Type  3 Games 
In  WPD  and  other  Type  3 games  the  players  have  a  dominant  strategy,  so 
there is a unique  NE  (and  EE)  at one  endpoint  of the state space  [o, i ].  Table 
3 shows  that  in sessions where  there  are always  6 or more  players  in a group, 
the state virtually  always  converges  tightly  to a BE and loosely  to the NE.  Even 
the  tight  NE  convergence  frequency  is  an  impressive  64%.  The  underlying 
data  show  that,  unlike  Type  i  and  2  games,  the  tight  NE  convergence 
frequency  in WPD  is lower  under  MM  than  under  RP. 
Group  size appears  to have  a significant  effect.  Some  WPD  and  PD  sessions 
involve  I 2  players  that  always  remain  in the same  group  and  some involve  i6 
players  sometimes  split  into  two  player  8 groups.  In  these  sessions  the  mean 
deviations  from  NE  consistently  were  small,  e.g.  OI2  in  the  8  player  split 
groups.  Deviations  were  much  more  variable  and  usually  much  larger  in 
sessions involving  runs with  smaller  groups  of 2,  4 and  6 players.  Line  i a-c  of 
Table  4 summarise  the results. The  mean  deviation  from NE  (i.e.,  the fraction 
of players  choosing  the dominated  'cooperative'  action)  rises to o028  with  two 
6 player groups,  to 0o29  with  three 4 player groups,  and to 0o39 with  six 2 player 
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Table  4 
Significance  Tests 
Deviations from NE  Hit Frequency 
Pools (X vs. Y)  [Nobs]  Means 
sessions  (S.D.)  Wilcoxon  Pooled t  x2  Pooled t 
i.  Group Size (WPD and PD) 
exp 4,  I 2,  24,  26 
(a)  6  vs. 8 player groups  0-28,  0-I2  8-84**  IO0I**  II  44  34I** 
[I82,  340]  (0-23,  01I5) 
(b) 4 vs. 8 player groups  0-29,  0-I2  5.78**  839**  0-04  O-I9 
[I20,  340]  (029,  o  I5) 
(C)  2  vs. 8 player groups  0-39,  OI  2  6-52**  II-38**  4  79  -21I9 
[546,  340]  (0-42,  O-  I 5) 
2.  RP vs. mean matching 
exp  3,  4,  I4,  I5,  2I,  22,  23,  24,  26 
(a)  HD  runs  014,  OIO  377**  3-94**  I440**  3-82** 
[420,  272]  (0-I2,  O-IO) 
(b) WPD and PD runs  014,  0-I4  -095  -053  3.82  -  *96 
[260,  2IO]  (o-i6,  O-I5) 
3.  No history vs. history 
exp 9,  I1,  I4,  2I,  22,  23,  24,  26 
(a)  HD  runs  o-i6,  0-I3  3-o8**  3-48**  3.64  I-9I 
[426,  446]  (0-  I 2,  O-I  I) 
(b)  WPD  and  PD  runs  o i6,  0-20  3I2**  -2.43  I 8-49**  -4-43** 
[I30,  I6o]  (O-I6,  O-I5) 
4.  No hist/RP  vs. hist/MM 
exp  27-30  (B-S  and  IDS  runs)  0-37,  0-27  5-55**  4-62**  38-20**  6.44** 
[23I,  222]  (0.2  I,  0.23) 
Notes: The statistics compare performance in Pool X to performance in Pool Y. For example in Line I b, 
PoQl  Y = runs with I 6 subjects  split into two non-interacting groups, each with 8 subjects and Pool X =  runs 
with I 2  subjects separated into three non-interacting groups with four subjects each. The number of periods 
(Nobs) appears in brackets. The second column records the mean absolute deviations from NE for Pools X 
and Y  (and the standard deviation of the deviations). The next two columns report the statistics for the 
standard Wilcoxon and t-tests for the null hypothesis that both pools have the same distribution for NE 
deviations. The last two columns report statistics  for the standard X  and t statistics  for the null hypothesis that 
both pools have the same hit frequency, where a period is counted as a hit if the deviation from NE does not 
exceed i /group size. Negative statistics indicate smaller deviations or higher hit frequency in pool X. Two 
asterisks (**) indicate that the null hypothesis is rejected at the p =  O-OI level. 
(repeated  matched  pairs)  groups."  These  deviations  are  significantly  larger 
than  those for the 8 player  groups  according  to standard  t and Wilcoxon  tests, 
as indicated  in  the  middle  columns  of the  table.  The  last  two  columns  of the 
table  compare  the  hit  frequencies,  i.e.  the  fractions  of  periods  in  which  the 
deviation  is  within  tolerance,  using  the  conservative  convention  that  the 
tolerance  bound  is b =  i /group  size. This convention  makes it easier for smaller 
groups  to  record  a  'hit'.  Even  so,  line  i a shows  that  the  fraction  of 6 player 
groups  hitting  NE  is significantly  lower  than  the  fraction  of 8 player  groups. 
The  hit  rates  differ  insignificantly  for  4  and  8  player  groups,  and  are 
significantly  higher  for  the  two  player  groups.  I  conclude  that  small  group 
"  Perhaps it should be mentioned that deviations remain large in these sessions  even when the players are 
regrouped into a single I 2  player group; the mean deviation in such runs is 0-24.  This is a vivid illustration 
of the general tendency for behaviour to be influenced by all treatments employed in within-groups sessions. 
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effects,  here  in  the form  of playing  the  dominated  'cooperative'  strategy,  are 
definitely  present  in  the  2,  4 and  6 player  groups. 
Scrambled  matrices  provide  unsought  opportunities  to  investigate  other 
Type  3 games.  Experiment  8 uses a matrix  that has a dominant  strategy  which 
also  gives  the  highest  mean  payoff;  players  in  this  session  chose  the 
dominant/Kantian  action  a remarkable  99 6 % of the  time. 
Recall  that IDS  is a 2-dimensional  analogue  of Type  3 games;  it has a unique 
NE  =  EE  at  one  corner  of  the  square  state  space.  The  convergence  rates 
reported  in line  7 of Table  3, e.g.  30  0  loose  and  I0 0o  tight  EE convergence, 
at first might  seem rather low.  Recall,  however,  that the matrix  entries for IDS 
were chosen  to make convergence  difficult  and that the target area for a corner 
equilibrium  is  only  b2. Moreover,  half  the  IDS  runs  used  the  RP/No  Hist 
treatment  for which  convergence  rates generally  are low.  Inspection  of the time 
graphs  under  the  more  favourable  treatment  MM/Hist  shows  a  consistent 
tendency  for the  state  to converge  towards  the  EE,  interrupted  by  occasional 
loops back into the interior when  a player in the second  population  chooses  the 
dominated  action.  I conclude  that the IDS  data  on closer examination  are well 
explained  by  evolutionary  game  theory. 
III.F.  Other  Findings 
Only  one session explored  behaviour  in HDB,  a I  -population  3-action  game 
with  a triangular  state space  and with  one  corner NE  (an EE with  target  area 
b2) and  one  edge  NE  (not  an EE but  with  target  area  2b2).  Row  6 of Table  3 
indicates  loose  (tight)  convergence  to some BE in  I 9  (I 2)  of 24  half-runs,  tight 
convergence  to the EE in 8 half-runs,  and  no loose or tight  convergence  to the 
edge  NE  despite  its  larger  area.  The  data  are  sparse  but  consistent  with 
evolutionary  game  theory. 
The  last four lines of Table  3 and  the last three lines of Table  4 indicate  the 
overall  effects of the matching  (MM  or RP)  and the feedback  (Hist or No Hist) 
protocols.  Table  3 indicates  that  tight  NE  and  EE  convergence  is somewhat 
more frequent  under  MM  and  under  Hist,  and  Table  4 confirms  that  hits are 
significantly  more frequent  and deviations  from NE significantly  smaller under 
MM.  However,  the  size of the  effects  is not  very  impressive. 
Do  the  evolutionary  treatments  MM  and  Hist  together  make  much 
difference?  Any  tendency  to speed convergence  would  be more noticeable  in a 
two-population  game,  and  should  be  confirmed  in  a balanced  within-groups 
design.  These  considerations  lead  to the design  of sessions 27-30.  The  last line 
of Table  4 shows  that  the IDS  and B-S  runs of these sessions had  significantly 
smaller  deviations  from the unique  NE  and significantly  higher  hit rates under 
Hist/MM  than  under  No  Hist/RP.  The  BoS  and  HD2  runs are omitted  from 
the  table  because  their  multiple  NE  make  deviations  more  difficult  to define 
clearly,  but  these  data  also  appear  to strongly  support  the same  conclusion. 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
Evolutionary  game  theory  offers  a  simple  classification  of  bimatrix  games, 
suggests  laboratory  protocols,  and  suggests  hypotheses  regarding  convergence 
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behaviour in bimatrix games. The evidence from a diverse set of laboratory 
games generally supports the seven hypotheses listed at the end of Section II. 
For  all  three  types of  one  dimensional games  and  their two  dimensional 
analogues, the states reliably achieve a loose behavioural equilibrium (BE) 
even within the first half-run of 5 periods. Most of the loose BE are also tight 
BE, the main exceptions occurring in two dimensional games with unique Nash 
equilibria (NE). Most BE coincide with NE, and most of the observed NE are 
indeed evolutionary equilibria (EE).  In  general,12 the 'evolutionary'  treat- 
ments  of  mean-matching  (MM)  and  feedback  (Hist)  appear  to  improve 
convergence to EE. Thus the main tendencies of the convergence data are 
consistent with evolutionary game theory. 
Two of the hypotheses deserve further discussion. The seventh hypothesis is 
concerned with  the stability of mixed  (or interior) NE.  It  states that such 
equilibria are achieved not by independent randomisations  by each player, but 
rather by  slight idiosyncratic preferences for pure strategies by  individual 
players.  The  individual  player  data  clearly  favour  this  version  of  the 
'purification' hypothesis. The group data also lend indirect support: as the 
hypothesis implies, we usually do see convergence to the interior NE = EE in 
one population games of Type i,  and less precise convergence in analogous two 
population games. 
The  fourth hypothesis is  concerned with  the  range  of  applicability for 
evolutionary  game  theory.  It  states  that  players  seldom  will  attempt  to 
influence others' future behaviour ('small group effects') when there are at 
least 6 players in  each group. The  relevant data  from Prisoner's dilemma 
experiments suggests that 6 is near the boundary. Cooperative ('Kantian') 
behaviour is considerably more prevalent in sessions  which have runs splitting 
the players into groups of size 2  or 4, and it is especially prevalent in the runs 
with the smaller groups. Such behaviour is notably less frequent in sessions 
where the minimum group size remains above 6. 
Perhaps  the  most  surprising  finding  concerns  another  boundary  for 
evolutionary  game  theory.  Pilot  experiments and  other  investigators had 
seemed to confirm the theoretical view that in simple coordination games with 
two pure strategy (corner) NE = EE and one interior NE, the 'risk-dominant' 
corner EE is most likely to  be observed because it has the larger basin of 
attraction. (Indeed, Kandori et al.  I 993, and Young, I 993 argue in influential 
theoretical papers that  only the  risk-dominant EE will  be  observed in  the 
relevant limiting case.) My data strongly support the contrary theoretical view 
of Bergin and Lipman (I995)  that one can bias convergence towards the other 
('payoff-dominant') EE by increasing the potential gains to cooperation, even 
holding  constant the  basins of attraction for the  two  EE.  The  underlying 
behaviour can be regarded as Kantian. It remains to be seen whether other 
subject pools  are  as  Kantian  as  mine,  but  it  now  appears that  in  some 
applications evolutionary game theory may have to be supplemented by a 
12  The main exception seems to be that when other conditions favour Kantian play (e.g. small numbers 
of WPD players), the MM  treatment can further encourage this sort of deviation from NE. 
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theory of trembles (or 'mutations') that allows for forward-looking  attempts to 
influence others' behaviour. 
University  of California,  Santa  Cruz 
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